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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from an order granting post conviction relief based on 
the prosecution's breach of a plea agreement. Petitioner asserts that the district 
court erred when it ordered as that he be resentenced as a remedy rather than 
allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This appeal presents a very narrow issue and so only a limited 
explanation of prior proceedings is necessary. As explained in the Order 
Granting Post-Conviction Relief (hereinafter Order), Petitioner was charged with 
Grand Theft by Deception and Persistent Violator. (R. p. 53.) He pied to one 
count of Grand Theft and the Persistent Violator charge was dismissed. (R. p. 
53.) He was sentenced by the original district judge to 11 years with the first 5 
years fixed to run concurrent with a pending Canyon County case. (R. p. 53.) 
After a failed direct appeal, Petitioner timely filed the instant petition for 
post conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney failed to object to the state's breach of plea agreement at sentencing 
when it failed to recommend the sentence it promised. (R. p. 54-55.) 
The district court ultimately found in Petitioner's favor, holding that the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement and that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object. (R. p. 63.) However, the district court ordered a resentencing as 
a remedy, rather than allowing Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea. (R. p. 65.) 
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 73.) 
1 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred when it ordered a resentencing as a remedy for 




THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED A RESENTENCING AS 
A REMEDY FOR THE PROSECUTOR'S BREACH OF PLEA AGREEMENT 
INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWAL OF THE GUILTY PLEA 
A. The State's Breach Of The Plea Agreement In This Case 
Since the court did find a breach of the plea agreement, the breach itself 
will be only briefly explained. The relevant terms of the plea agreement were 
that Mr. McAmis would plead guilty to one count of Grand Theft and the state 
would dismiss the persistent violator enhancement. (R. p. 58.) Further, the plea 
agreement required that the state recommend a sentence of 5 years with the first 
2 years fixed and that the sentence be suspended. (R. p. 59.) Instead, at 
sentencing, the prosecutor recommended that the judge imposed incarceration 
consistent with the recommendations in the PSI. (R. p. 59) Defense counsel, 
rather than objecting to the state's failure to honor its promise, instead stated that 
he "apparently misunderstood the nature of the plea discussions with the State." 
(R. p. 60.) 
The criminal court, after stating that it considered, inter alia, the 
presentation of the prosecutor, imposed a sentence of 11 years with the first five 
years fixed which was not suspended. (R. p. 60.) 
The post conviction court (a different district judge) found after an 
evidentiary hearing that there was a plea agreement, the prosecution made a 
recommendation inconsistent with its promise, and that defense counsel failed to 
object. (R. p. 62-63.) The post conviction court continued by stating while it 
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cannot determine that it would have been probable that an objection by defense 
counsel would have altered the original judge's sentencing decision, there is a 
district possibility that had the prosecution made recommendations consistent 
with the plea agreement and/or defense objected, that Mr. McAmis would have 
received a more favorable sentence. (R. p. 63.) Further, the court stated that 
had defense counsel objected, Mr. McAmis may have been given the opportunity 
to withdraw his guilty plea in order to protect his negotiated rights. (R. p. 63.) 
First, this court did not originally sentence McAmis so it cannot 
determine without speculating whether there is a reasonable 
probability that the sentencing outcome would have been different if 
his attorney would have effectively compelled the prosecuting 
attorney to make sentencing recommendations consistent with the 
plea agreement. However, McAmis was clearly prejudiced by the 
breach and this denial of a constitutionally protected right should 
entitle him to a new sentencing hearing where he receives specific 
performance of the promised recommendation. 
Order, p. 12-13. (R. p. 63-64.) 
Later, the district court concluded: 
This court finds no basis to set aside the Defendant's guilty plea in 
this case. The guilty plea was validly entered. The appropriate 
remedy in this case is to provide McAmis specific performance of 
the prosecuting attorney's plea bargained sentencing 
recommendations during a resentencing hearing. 
Order, p. 14. (R. p. 65.) 
B. The Law Regarding Breached Plea Agreements 
The law regarding the two possible remedies for the prosecution's breach 
of a plea agreement is well established and has been stated in many Idaho 
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cases, an example being State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 77 P.3d 988 (Ct.App. 
2003): 
It is well established that "when a plea rests in any significant 
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can 
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise 
must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 
S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 433 (1971). This principle is 
derived from the Due Process Clause and the fundamental rule 
that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and intelligent. 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508-09, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-47, 
81 L.Ed.2d 437, 442-43 (1984); If the prosecution has breached its 
promise given in a plea agreement, whether that breach was 
intentional or inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant's plea 
was knowing and voluntary, for the defendant has been led to plead 
guilty on a false premise. In such event, the defendant will be 
entitled to relief. Santobel/o, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 
L.Ed.2d at 433; Mabry, 467 U.S. at 508-09, 104 S.Ct. at 2546-47, 
81 L.Ed.2d at 442-43; As a remedy, the court may order specific 
performance of the agreement or may permit the defendant to 
withdraw the guilty plea. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at 
499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433; .... 
Id., p. 301-302 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). 
In State v. Acuna, 294 P.3d 1151, 1154 (Idaho Ct.App. 2013), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision that there was no breach of a 
plea agreement and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the 
appropriate remedy was specific performance or to give the defendant the option 
of withdrawing her guilty plea. 
Appellant is unaware of any Idaho case law concerning our specific issue 
of which remedy is appropriate, to wit, withdrawal of guilty plea or specific 
performance, but it seems safe to assume that it is a matter of discretion of the 
district court. Accordingly, the standard of review for abuse of discretion would 
apply. 
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The well established standard of review for an abuse of discretion is as 
explained in Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65 (2007): 
Abuse of discretion is determined by a three part test which asks 
whether the district court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason." 
Id. p. 71 (internal citations omitted).1 
C. The Court Erred in Not Allowing Mr. McAmis to Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
The court's only reason for holding that it would not allow Mr. McAmis to 
withdraw his guilty plea was that it was validly entered. But as explained below 
by the United States Supreme Court, the fact that the plea was valid is the very 
reason that a defendant is entitled to a remedy (which can include rescission). 
In Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009), which concerned the 
proper federal standard of review for a breach of plea agreement where there 
was no objection, the United States Supreme Court explained: 
First, there is nothing to support the proposition that the 
Government's breach of a plea agreement retroactively causes the 
defendant's agreement to have been unknowing or involuntary. Any 
more than there is anything to support the proposition that a mere 
breach of contract retroactively causes the other party's promise to 
have been coerced or induced by fraud. Although the analogy may 
not hold in all respects, plea bargains are essentially contracts. See 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 81 L. Ed. 2d 
437 (1984). When the consideration for a contract fails--that is, 
when one of the exchanged promises is not kept--we do not say 
that the voluntary bilateral consent to the contract never existed, so 
that it is automatically and utterly void; we say that the contract was 
broken. See 23 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 63.1 (4th ed. 
1 While that case happened to concern a motion for reconsideration, the standard 
would be the same for our issue. 
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2002) (hereinafter Williston). The party injured by the breach will 
generally be entitled to some remedy, which might include the right 
to rescind the contract entirely, see 26 id., § 68.1 (4th ed. 2003); 
but that is not the same thing as saying the contract was never 
validly concluded. 
So too here. When a defendant agrees to a plea bargain, the 
Government takes on certain obligations. If those obligations are 
not met, the defendant is entitled to seek a remedy, which might in 
some cases be rescission of the agreement, allowing him to take 
back the consideration he has furnished, i.e., to withdraw his plea. 
But rescission is not the only possible remedy; in Santobello we 
allowed for a resentencing at which the Government would fully 
comply with the agreement--in effect, specific performance of the 
contract. 404 U.S., at 263, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427. In any 
case, it is entirely clear that a breach does not cause the guilty 
plea, when entered, to have been unknowing or involuntary. It is 
precisely because the plea was knowing and voluntary (and hence 
valid) that the Government is obligated to uphold its side of the 
bargain. 
Id., p. 137-138 (emphasis in the original, footnote omitted). 
In our case, the post conviction court's express reason for not allowing 
withdrawal of the plea was that it was validly entered. But this reasoning is 
exactly contrary to the United States Supreme Court's explanation that because 
the plea is valid the defendant is entitled to a remedy for the state's breach, 
which can include withdrawal of the plea or specific performance. 
Given the post conviction court's misunderstanding of the law where it 
believed that the validity of the plea excluded withdrawal of the plea as a remedy, 
it could not have properly exercised its discretion in selecting a remedy because 
it did not realize that withdrawal of the plea could still be an appropriate remedy. 
So at the very least, this matter must be remanded to the post conviction court so 
that it can select an appropriate remedy based on a correct understanding of the 
law. 
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However, Appellant asserts that such a remand is not actually necessary 
and that this Court may simply reverse the decision and order that the post 
conviction court allow withdrawal of the guilty plea because that is the proper 
remedy under these circumstances. 
To begin with, even the post conviction court stated that had defense 
counsel objected, Mr. McAmis may have been given the opportunity to withdraw 
his guilty plea in order to protect his negotiated rights. But then, the post 
conviction court did not allow that remedy. 
Next, the prosecutor had promised to recommend a sentence of five years 
with the first two years fixed, suspended. Instead, the prosecutor recommended 
a sentence of incarceration, and the criminal court imposed a sentence of 11 
years with the first five years fixed. As the post conviction court noted, had the 
prosecutor made its promised recommendation there is a distinct possibility that 
Mr. McAmis would have received a more favorable sentence. But since the 
district court, based at least in part on the prosecutor's presentation, imposed 
instead of suspending a sentence that was also much, much, longer than what 
should have been recommended, the probation ship has obviously now sailed. 
In other words, given the state's breach of the plea agreement, the die is 
now cast for an imposed sentence, and a resentencing will be overshadowed by 
the fact that the prosecutor did not really believe that a sentence of probation 
was proper even if he now claims as much. Nor is the slate blank in regards to 
the resentencing court, since it is known that the original judge did not believe 
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that probation was proper, and instead imposed a sentence where the fixed time 
was the same as what should have been the recommended total sentence. 
In short, this is a case where things need to start fresh, and so Mr. 
McAmis should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's grant of· post conviction relief be 
modified to allow Mr. McAmis to withdraw his guilty plea, or in the alternative, to 
remand this matter for th~ourt to reconsider the appropriate remedy. 
DATED this l{Q day of July, 2013 . 
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